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　　　The　role　of　the　state　in　development　is　accepted　today　as　essential，　and
the　models　of　the　developmental　state　draw　the　attention　of　many．　The　mod－
els　were　already　relatively．well　established　in　the　previous　decade，　but　they
are　mostly　concerned　with　domestic　politics，　and　do　little　to　explain　how　these
states　managed　foreign　aid　so　that　it　was　effectively　used．　This　paper　ex－
plores　this　issue　by　looking　at　the　Japanese　economic　cooperation　to　South
Korea．
　　　The　argument　is，　first，　the　negotiations　were　indeed　political　on　both
sides，　taking　into　account　various　issues　and　considerations　including　domes－
tic　ones．　Then，　second，　in　such　negotiations，　Korean　policy　makers’strong
sense　of　ownership　over　their　proposed　projects　and　programs　was　the　key
that　enabled　them　to　effectively　manage　the　aid　negotiations　and　obtain
Japanese　cooperation　as　necessa「y．
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Introduction
　　　Recent　international　discussions　on　development　have　seen　a　re－
newed　interest　in　the　developmental　state．　Once　being　controversial，
when　this　concept　came　into　being，　the　role　of　the　state　in　development
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has　now　come　to　be　recognized　as　central　and　essential（World　Bank
1997），and　many　scholars　and　practitioners　these　days　are　talking　about
how　to　make　an　effective　state，　or　to　make　states　developmental（for
instance，　Grindle　2004；Fritz　and　Menocal　2006）．
　　　There　are　already　widely　accepted　models　of　the　developmental
state　after　the　experience　of　some　East　Asian　countries　as　compared
with　those　in　Latin　America　or　in　Africa．　Such　models　usually　empha・
size　the　importance　and　centrality　of　the　state　in　managing　the　econ－
omy，　and　try　to　elaborate　the　institutions　and　the　politics　or　political
economy　where　the　state　elite－most　typically，　the　political　leadership
and　the　relevant　bureaucratic　elites－maintained　their　autonomy（Hag－
gard　1990）or　embedded　autonomy（Evans　l992，1995）from　society，　by
which　they　could　formulate　and　implement　due　policies　without　being
disturbed　by　irrational　domestic　politics．
　　　However，　these　concepts　of　autonomy，　insulation　and　embedded
autonomy　do　not　solve　the　problem　of　external　funding　and　technology．
Almost　by　definition，　developing　countries　lack　capital　and　technology，
which　are　in　fact　essential　for　the　accelerated　transformation　of　econ－
omy　and　society．　These　come　from　abroad，　and　yet　the　potential　pro－
viders　of　these　resources　are　usually　too　mighty　for　the　elites　in
developing　countries　to　influence，　or　even　to　effectively　negotiate　with．
Even　the　domestically　highly　effective　leadership　of　a　developmental
state　should　not　be　an　exception．
　　　Accordingly，　how　a　developing　country　could　manage　this　problem
is　the　concern　of　this　paper．　More　precisely，　taking　the　case　of　Japan’s
economic　cooperation　to　one　of　the　most　successful　developmental
states　in　East　Asia，　the　Republic　of　Korea（ROK，　or　South　Korea），　it
explores　how　a　small　developmental　state　effectively　negotiated　with
the　powerful　donors　in　obtaining　necessary　funding　and　technology．
As　will　be　shown　below，　Japan　was　one　of　the　two　most　important
external　sources　of　funding　and　technology　for　the　developmental
Korea，　the　other　being　the　United　States，　while　the　magnitude　of　the
latter　almost　constantly　declined　with　time　during　the　Korean　Miracle
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days．
　　　After　a　brief　overview　of　the　trajectory　of　economic　growth　and　aid
in　the　country，　the　paper　will　examine　the　political　economy　of　Japan’s
economic　cooperation　to　South　Korea　by　looking　at　the　position，　con－
cerns　and　interests　of　each　country　in　the　international　political　econ－
omy　of　the　time　as　well　as　the　domestic　politics　in　respective　countries．
Then，　the　paper　will　take　a　glance　at　the　institutional　framework　for　the
bilateral　negotiations　between　the　two　countries，　and，　on　the　basis　of　all
these，　finally　will　explore　how　South　Korea　managed，　or　failed，　the
negotiations　and　won　at　least　part　of　the　cooperation　it　needed　for　its
goal　of　developlrlent．
THE　KOREAN　MIRACLE　AND　ECONOMIC　COOPERATION
TO　SOUTH　KOREA
　　　South　Korea　is　one　of　the　most　celebrated　cases　of　what・was－called
the　East　Asian　Miracle．　The　miracle　has　its　origins　in　1961，　when　Park
Chung　Hee　came　in　power　through　a　military　coup．　Only　within　a
generation　since　then，　the　South　Koreans　transformed　their　impover－
ished　resource－poor　agrarian　society　into　a　fully・developed　industrial
democracy．　Its　per　capita　GNP　was　only　239　US　dollars　in　1962（EPB
1982），when　the　country　embarked　on　its　First　Five－Year　Economic
Development　Plan’under　the　new　regime，　but　it　steadily　and　yet　rapidly
increased　to　10，590　dollars　in　1996（OECD　2000），when　Korea　was　admit・
ted　into　the　OECD，　the　rich－nations　club．
　　　In　this　drastic　transition，　South　Korea’s　adverse　international　posi－
tion　as　a　divided　nation　and　front　line　country　in　the　Cold　War　in　fact
secured　the　country　a　huge　amount　of　foreign　aid　from　western　powers，
particularly　from　the　United　States．　With　the　increasing　tension　in
Indochina　in　the　late　1960s，　however，　it　was　gradually　replaced　by　the
superpower’s　emerging　ally　in　Far　East，　Japan．
　　　Official　resource　flows　to　Korea　in　the　early　l960s　were　almost
exclusively　from　the　US．　From　the　mid－1960s，　when　Japan　normalized
（135） 135
政経論叢　第79巻第1・2号
its　relations　with　South　Korea，　however，　the　share　of　Japan　increased
and　Japan　replaced　the　US　as　the　major　donor　to　the　country　in　the　first
half　of　the　1970s，　while　the　finance　from　multilateral　institutions，　most
notably　the　World　Bank，　grew　larger　after　the　mid－1970s．　When　more
concessional　aid　money　is　concerned，　the　Japanese　Official　Develop－
ment　Assistance（ODA）almost　constantly　accounted　for　more　than　30
per　cent　of　Korea’s　total　ODA　receipt　throughout　the　1970s，　with　an
increasing　tendency　from　the　late　l970s　into　the　l980s．　The　US　share，　on
the　contrary，　constantly　decreased　from　over　60　per　cent　in　1970　to
nearly　20　per　cent　in　1980，　and　only　to　one　digit　figures　in　the　following
years．　When　private　flows　are　also　included，　the　total　financial　flow　of
resources　from　Japan　most　often　surpassed　that　from　the　US，　account－
ing　for　nearly　around　40　per　cent　of　all（OECD　1966－1993）．
　　　This　means　that　Japan　was　at　least　one　of　the　most，　and　probably
the　single　most，　important　sources　of　external　finance　for　developmen－
tal　Korea　during　its　high　growth　period．　Particularly　in　the　I970s，　when
Korea　embarked　on　its　controversial　heavy　and　chemical　industrializa・
tion　program2，　Japan’s　cooperation　both　in　terms　of　finance　and　technol－
ogy　played　a　critical　role，　at　least　as　a　catalyst．　Bilateral　relations
between　Japan　and　Korea，　however，　were　not　very　good　or　stable－
sometimes　very　antagonistic，　and　usually　at　least　very　sensitive，　and
thus　volatile．　For　Japan，　economic　cooperatiorl　to　South　Korea　was
politically　quite　sensitive　due　to　various　reasons　including　the　history
and　the　relations　with　the　North．　Despite　all　the　difficulties，　however，
sometimes　thorough　extremely　tough　negotiations，　South　Koreans　won
the　help　of　Japanese　assistance　to　many　projects，　by　which　they　could
strongly　propel　the　upgrading　of　its　industrial　structure．　Existing　Pos・
sibilities　were　sought　for　as　much　as．possible　so　that　the　limited　re－
sources　were　effectively，　if　not　efficiently　as　some　argue，　mobilized，　and
then　utiiized．
　　　How　this　became　possible　is　in　order．
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BACKGROUND：THE　INTERNATIONAL　ENVIRONMENT
　　　The　United　States　was　the　single　most　important　ally　for　both
Japan　and　South　Korea．　For　most　of　the　postwar　period　in　the　twenti・
eth　century，　however，　the　alliance　relationship　among　these　three　coun－
tries　was　quite　deformed　at　least　in　two　ways．　First，　while　it　could　be
called　as　the　US－Japan－ROK　alliance，　the　Japan－ROK　part　of　this　trian－
gular　relationship，　in　fact，　was　almost　missing．　Even　with　the　other　two
clearly　existing　relationships，　secondly，　these　relationships　were　not
those　between　equal　partners　but　almost　unilateナal　particularly　in
terms　of　security．　Both　of　Japan　and　South　Korea　were　significantly
dependent　on　the　US　forces　in　terms　of　defense，　while　they　could　offer
very　little　to　the　US　in　return．　In　addition，　at　least　at　the　initial　stages
of　the　postwar　development，　both　countries　were　heavily　dependent　on
the　US　economic　assistance　as　well，　and　then，　later，　their　export－
oriented　economies　relied　much　on　the　US　market　for　their　products，
Washington　was　quite　generous　to　these　two　East　Asian　allies　in　the
Cold　War　international　political　economy．
　　　In　time，　however，　the　l960s　has　witnessed　the　so－called　Japanese
Miracle　on　one　hand，　and　the　increasing　US　difficulties　in　Vietnam　and
the　accompanying　severe　fiscal　burden　on　the　federal　treasury．　As　a
result，　the　United　States　under　Richard　Nixon　started　partially　to　re－
treat　from　Asia　at　the　turn　of　the　new　decade，　demanding　some　burden
sharing　to　the　countries　in　the　region．
　　　Considering　the　importance　of　the　US　role　in　the　region　in　the　l950s
and　1960s，　it　is　natural　to　assume　such　a　new　foreign　policy　of　the　US，
later　to　be　called　the　Guam　Doctrine，　or　the　Nixon　Doctrine，　would　pose
agreat　security　threat　to　the　whole　region．　It　was　indeed　understood　to
be　a　great　threat　in　South　Korea，　raising　serious　concerns　and　uncer－
tainties．　To　Japan，　however，　it　was，　probably，　rather　an　opportunity　to
pursue　its　independent　foreign　policy　than　to　continue　its　dependencb
on　the　US，　while　still　remaining　under　the　US　nuclear　umbrella．
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Therefore，　burden　sharing　in　terms　of　economic　cooperation　was　under－
stood　to　be　inevitable　and　even　rather　welcomed，　and　in　fact，　as　argued
by　some　scholars　such　as　Calder（1988），　the　US　demands　and　pressures
were　sometimes　used　by　policy　makers　in　Tokyo　to　mitigate　political
oPPosition，　Only　concerns　for　the　Japanese　leaders　and　the　business
community　regarding　economic　cooperation　to　Asia　were　the　possibili・
ties　of　future　competition　with　those　countries　which　Japan　would　be
assisting．　The　negotiations　on　Japan’s　cooperation　with　Korea’s　heavy
and　chemical　industry　were　a　case　in　point．　The　Japanese　side　in　fact
declined　to　exterld　cooperation　to　some　of　the　Korean　priority　sectors
such　as　ship－building　due　to　the　consideration　over　competitiveness　in
the　world　market（EPB　1971）．
　　　Another　big　change　in　East　Asian　international　politics　since　the
end　of　the　1960s　into　the　1970s　also　posed　a　threat　to　Korea　yet　allother
opportunity　to　Japan．　The　People’s　Republic　of　China，　which　was　al－
ready　a　heavy－weight　in　the　international　community　since　the　mid・
1950s　as　one　of　the　leaders　of　the　non－alliance　nations，　was　admitted　to
the　United　Nations　in　l969，　replacing　the　Republic　of　China（Taiwan），
and　sat　as　a　permanent　member　of　the　Security　Council．　The　impact　of
the　ascendance　of　China　in　the　world　was　further　amplified　by　the
power　politics　in　the　l970s，　The　US　amazed　the　world　by　announcing　in
1971that　it　started　normalization　negotiations　with　China，　and　the
President　Nixon　would　visit　Beijing　next　year．　China　at　that　time　had
frictions　with　the　Soviet　Union．　Certain　ties　between　Beijing　and　Wash－
ington　were　understood　by　both　of　the　countries　as　gaining　some　lever－
age　over　Moscow．　This　really　shocked　the　world　at　first，　but　it　shortly
came　to　be　welcomed　by　Japan，　and　also　by　many　other　Western　coun・
tries．　Japan’s　policy　to　China　in　the　1960s　had　been　realistic；it　had　kept
substantial　commercial　relations　without　diplomatic　ties．　With　the
deepening　US　involvement　in　Vietnam，　which　adversely　affected
Japan’s　relations　with　China，　however，　Japan　needed　to　be　cautious
about　furthering　the　relations　with　China，　Japan，　aiming　for　the　return
of　Okinawa，　the　islands　territory　which　had　been　occupied　by　the　US．
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since　the　end　of　World　War　II，　on　some　favorable　conditions，　needed　to
keep　good　relations　with　the　US．　In　order　to　settle　and　finally　terminate
its　postwar　arrangements，　the　Sato　government　was　determined　to
realize　the　return　of　the　islands　with　full　recovery　of　Japan’s　sover－
eignty　over　all　the　territory．’she　main　issue　at　stake　was　the　status　of
the　U．S　bases，　which　was　critical　in　the　US　strategy　in　IAsia　and　the
Pacific．　Easy　compromise　was　not　possible　for　either　side．　Therefore，
this　unexpected　change　of　U．S．　policy　to　China　was　understood　to　be　a
sign　long　awaited　for　by　Japan．　Japan　followed　suit，　establishing　diplo－
matic　relations　with　China　only　within　seven　months　after．Nixon’s　visit
to　China．
　　　The　situation　was　not　that　simple　for　Korea．　This　change　increased
uncertainties　for　Korea　to　an　unprecedented　level．　In　the　Korean　War
two　decades　earlier，　the　US　supported　the　South　while　China　stood　for
the　North．　South　Korean　leaders　were　devastated，　and　felt　that　they
coul4　no　more　depend　on　the　US，　or　any　other　big　poWers　who　would
easily　sacrifice　the　interests　of　their　small　allies．　The　Okinawa　issue，
which　was　principally　only　bilateral　issue　between　Japan　and　the　US，
also　raised　a　serious　concern　in　Seoul　because　full　recovery　of　the　Japa－
nese　sovereignty　over　the　islands　would　lay　restraint　on　the　US　usage
of　the　bases　there3．　The　US　forces　in　Okinawa　were　considered　to　be
critical　for　security　on　the　peninsu正a・
　　　Thus　the　international　politics　of　d6tente　alienated　South　Korea　so
that　they　became　determined　to　pursue　the　path　for　self－reliance，　while
it　encouraged　Japan，　the　second　largest　economy　in　the　western　bloc，　to
take　more　independent　foreign　policy．
THE　POSTWAR　JAPANESE　POHTICS　AND　DIPLOMACY
　　　The　postwar　Japan’s　diplomacy　started　in　April　l952，　when　the　San
Francisco　Peace　Treaty　came　into　effect．　In　the　first　issue　of　its　Blue
Boole　OfDiplomacy　published　in　September　1957，　the　Ministry　of　Foreign
Affairs（MOFA）declared　the　three　principles　of　Japan’s　foreign　policy，
（139） 139
政経論叢　第79巻第1・2号
which　are：1）the　UN－centrism，2）coordination　and　harmony　with　the
liberal　countries　in　the　western　bloc，　and　3）the　identity　as　an　Asian
nation（MOFA　1957）．　However，　it　is　usually　understood　that　these
principles　were　only　diplomatic，　or　even　cosmetic（Iokibe　1999），and　the
real　policy　was　known　as　the　Yoshida　Doctrine，　which　is　also　summa－
rized　into　three　main　points，　namely，1）the　supremacy　of　Japan－US
relations，2）coordination　and　harmony　with　other　western　nations　only
within　the　framework　of　the　l）above，　and　3）importance　of　economic
matters（with　1ess　consideration　on　security，　which　was　assured　by　the
US　under　the　Japan－US　Security　Treaty）4．
　　　This　policy　was　basically　successful，　at　least　in　the　first　few　dec－
ades．　In　the　Cold　War　international　political　economy，　as　mentioned
above，　Japan’s　special　alliance　with　the　US　gave　the　country　the　favor－
able　environment　where　it　could，　first，　save　substantial　money　other－
wise　to　be　spent　for　defense，　and　second，　obtain　the　opportunity　to
concentrate　on　economic　recovery　and　development　with　the　almost
secured　market　first　in　the　US，　then　in　Southeast　Asia．
　　　Japan　enjoyed　its　miraculous　high　growth　from　the　early　1960s　to
the　mid－1970s，　and　became　the　second　largest　economy　only　next　to　the
US　as　early　as　in　1967．　Its　economic　cooperation　program　started　in
1954，when　Japan　participated　in　the　Colombo　Plan5　and　initiated　techni－
cal　cooperation　to　Southeast　Asian　countries．　However，　it　was　very
smal1，　almost　minimal　in　scale，　and　more　substantial　part　of　its　initial
ODA　program　took　in　fact　in　the　form　of　postwar　reparation　payment．
　　　Reparation　payment　was　a　heavy　burden　for　Japan，　though　the
amount　had　already　been　substantially　reduced　in　the　Cold　War　inter－
national　political　economy6．　Nevertheless，　Japanese　leaders　soon　accom－
modated　themselves　to　the　situation　and　tried　to　utilize　the　payment
somehow　in　a　way　beneficial　to　Japan　by　establishing　friendly　ties　with
the　recipient　countries7．　The　Ministry　of　International　Trade　and　Indus－
try（MITI）explicitly　tried　to　connect　this　to　export　promotion　and
securing　natural　resources（MITI　l961）．　Starting　in　1955　to　Burma，
Japan　paid　postwar　reparations　and　semi－reparationss　to　twelve
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countries　in　Asia　and　the　Pacific　including　South　Korea．　The　total
payments　over　22　years　amounted　to　more　than　525　billion　yen（1．5
billion　US　dollars），　completing　in　1976（MOFA　l977）．　In　fact，　as　was
envisaged　by　the　MITI，　it　would　be　proper　to　say　that　th6　reparation
payments　and　related　economic　cooperation　made　substantial　contribu－
tion　not　only　to　the　recipients　but　also　to　Japan　by　facilitating　its　eco－
nomic　relations　with　Asian　countries　without　raising　local　political
concerns，　which　might　otherwise　be　rather　difficult．　Reparation　pay－
ments　were　categorized　as　ODA，　and　accounted　for　more　than　a　half　of
the　total　ODA　in　1960　and　l961，　and　more　than　40　per　cent　in　the　follow－
ing　two　years（MITI　l975）．
　　　On　the　other　hand，　as　was　expressed　in　the　Yoshida　Doctrine，　Japan
was　reluctant　to　play　a　political　role　in　the　international　community．
Particularly　in　the　field　of　security，　due　to　its　historical　past，　what－is－
called　peace　corlstitution　and　the　Japan－US　Security　Treaty，　Japan　was
heavily　dependent　on　the　US　even　for　its　own　national　defense．　While
it　gradually　built　up　substantial　military　capability　of　its　own，　its　possi－
ble　contribution　to　the　regional／world　security　was　narrowly　limited
only　to　the　provision　of　the　bases　to　the　US　military　forces　until　quite
recently．
　　　Toward　the　end　of　the　1960s，　however，　with　the　increasing　eco・
nomic　power　and　influence　of　Japan　in　the　world，　the　US　started　to
demand　some　burden　sharing　to　Japan　in　the　region．　The　situation　in
Vietnam　was　turning　against　the　US．　Domestically，　the　fiscal　burden　of
waging　war　bore　heavily　on　the　federal　budget，　and　the　anti－war　popu・
lar　movement　was　raising　voice，　The　US　could　no　longer　bear　all　the
responsibilities　for　security　in　East　Asia　and　the　Pacific．　Some　of　them
needed　to　be　transferred　to　the　newly　emerging　power　in　the　region．
There　seemed　to　be　ample　rationale　both　geopolitically，　economically　as
well　as　historically　for　Japan　to　take　this　role　on　the　neighboring　penin－
sula．
　　　On　the　domestic　front　in　Tokyo，　policy　toward　Korea　often　in・
volved　sensitive　issues　because　there　were　both　pro－North　and　pro一
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South　wings　in　the　mainstreams　of　Japanese　politics．　This　could　make
economic　relations　with　Korea　very　political　in　Japan．、Because　of　the
colonial　history，　some　influential　leaders　in　the　ruling　Liberal　Demo－
cratic　Party（LDP）and　the　business　community　maintained　persona正
ties　with　South　Korean　elites．　They　formed　associations　such　as　Japan・
Korea　Economic　Associationg　that　played　important　roles　in　Japan－
Korea　economic　cooperation　after　the　normalization　of　relations．　On
the　other　hand，　there　were　pro－North　leaders　as　well　not　only　in　Japan
socialist　Party　（JsP），　the　strongest　oPPosition　in　the　so－called　1955－
system，　but　also　in　the　LDP　due　to　the　existence　of　large　Korean　com－
munities　in　their　constituencies．　With　the　backing　of　these　politicians，
General　Association　of　Korean　Residents　in　Japanio　could　work　as　an
effective　pressure　group　as　necessary　in　the　Japanese　politics．　In　addi－
tion，　not　only　the　North－related　political　activities，　but　sometimes　anti－
government　political　activists　against　the　authoritarian　leadership　in
the　South　also　chose　Japan　or　the　United　States　as　their　arena　of　activi－
ties　due　to　the　strong　repression　within　their　own　country　against
themll．　They　tried　to　use　public　opinion　of　these　democracies　as　the
pressure　against　their　own　government．
　　　It　is　often　agreed　that　foreign　policy　does　not　have　vocal　domestic
constituency　in　Japan．　Issues　of　economic　cooperation，　in　particular，　are
usually　understood　to　fall　in　the　administrative　domain．　The　Diet
rarely　took　up　these　issues12，　and　thus　they　were　almost　exclusively
dealt　with　within　the　bureaucracy．　Literature　on　Japanese　economic
assistance　usually　argues　decision－making　power　rests　within　the　bu－
reaucracy，　particularly　among　four　relevant　ministerial　agencies：the
Ministry　of　Finance（MOF），　MOFA，　MITI，　and　the　Economic　Planning
Agencyi3．　However，　Korea　was　exception．　The　above・mentioned　situa－
tion　often　made　Japanese　foreign　policy　toward　the　Korean　peninsula
politi（｝ally　sensitive　and　controversiaL
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THE　POLITIC　OF　DEVELOPMENTAL　SOUTH　KOREA
　　　South　Korea　under　Park　was　one　of　the　most　typical　developmental
regimes　in　East　Asia　which　tried　to　establish　their　legitimacy　though
attaining　developmental　goals．　The　young　military　generals　who　led
the　coup　in　1961　had　a　firm　commitment　of　rescuing　their　people　from
absolute　poverty　and　making　the　county　developed．　After　two－and－a－
half　years　as　head　of　the　interim　government，　Park，　who　had　already
retired　from　the血1itary　service，加as　elected　as　president　in　late　1963
and　stayed　in　office　unti10ctober　l979，　when　he　was　assassinated　by　the
head　of　intelligence．　During　his　rule，　which　became　more　and　more
authoritarian　particu正arly　in　the　1970s，　the　country　achieved　the　Korean
Miracle，　the　sustained　high　economic　growthi4．
　　　In　order　to　keep　the　commitment　and　make　the　nation　wealthier，
the　state　institutions　and　the　political　economy　there　were　overhauled
and　adjusted　to　be　effective　for　development　as　argued　elsewhere　in　the
literature（for　instance，　Amsden　l989；Haggard　1990；Evans　1995；Woo－
Cumings　1999；Kohli　2004）．　The　state　and　politics　mattered．　Besides，
however，　the　necessity　for　capital　was　unquestioned．　Extensive　pov－
erty　meant　very　little　domestic　savings．　It　had　no　natural　resource　or
agricultural　product　to　earn　foreign　exchange．　In　a　Cold　War　front　line
country　with　the　experience　of　real　war　which　was　only　suspended
without　a　peace　treaty　ten　years　earlierl5，　nobody　outside　the　country
was　willing　to　invest．　As　a　result，　South　Korea　had　been　supported　by
huge　US　economic　assistance　since　the　end　of　the　Korean　War，　but　the
US　aid　was　decreasing　in　the　mid－1960s，　and　grant　was　expected　to　be
terminated　in　some　years．　Korea　desperately　needed　other　sources　of
capital－foreign　capital，　in　particular．　West　Germany，　also　a　divided
nation　under　the　Cold　War　system，　offered　some　assistance，　yet　it　was
not　enough　to　realize　the　commitment　to　promote　development　and
alleviate　poverty．
　　　It　was　such　a　situation　that　drove　Park　and　his　government　for　the
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early　settlement　of　the　controversial　normalization　with　Japan．
　　　The　Korean　peninsula　was　ruled　by　the　Japanese　for　35　years　until
the　end　of　World　War　II，　when　Japan　abandoned　all　the　newly　acquired
territories　in　the　previous　decades　after　the　Meiji　Restoration．　Urged　by
the　US，　normalization　talks　started　as　early　as　in　1951　when　Japan　was
still　under　the　US　occupation．　However，　the　negotiations　did　not　pro－
ceed　smoothly　due　to　the　deep　discrepancy　of　the　recognitions　both
sides　held　over　the　past．　The　Korean　side　demanded　enormous　compen－
sation　for　the　colonial　rule　they　suffered　from，　while　the　Japanese　re－
sponded　with　too　little，　sometimes　even　claiming　that　Korean　people
had　to　thank　Japan　since　colonization　somewhat　promoted　moderniza・
tion　of　the　peninsula．　Such　a　claim　naturally　antagonized　the　Korean
national　feeling　against　Japanとnd　further　complicated　the　negotiations．
Reaching　compromise　seemed　to　be　extremely　difficult．　It　was　clear　to
the　new　Korean　leaders，　however，　that　normalization　would　surely
bring　them　a　substantial　amount　of　foreign　exchange　as　economic
cooperation互6．　Park　decided　to　go　for　it，．　and　sought　for　an　early　conclu－
sion，　namely，　through　considerable　compromise　in　terms　of　the　amount
they　claimed．　The　opposition　party　and　the　people　were　furious，　calling
this　deal　as　the　national　shame．　The　government　needed　finally　to
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　！
suppress　the　angry　demonstrations　by　force，　which　was　politically
costly，　yet　in　the　end　it　secured　three　hundred　million　dollars　in　grant，
two　hundred　million　dollars　in　yen　loan，　and　another　more・than・two－
hundred．高奄撃撃奄盾氏@as　private　loans　to　be　provided　by　installments　over
ten　years，　which　indeed　was　enormous　for　Korea　at　that　time．　Normali－
zation　also　opened　the　way　to　the　possibilities　for　further　economic
cooperation　and　technical　assistance，　both　of　which　were　critical　for
further　industrialization　and　development．
　　　With　the　concerted　effort　by　the　government　and　the　people　for
development，　the　targets　of　the　First　Five－Year　Economic　Dev610pment
Plan（1962－66）were　successfully　attainedi7　and　some　basic　infrastruc－
tures　such　as　power　and　transportation　were　established　as　well　as
some　basic　industries，　and　export　was　promoted　to　earn　foreign
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exchange（EPB　1982）．　On　the　basis　of　these　achievements，　the　major
goals　for　the　Second　Plan　period（1967－1971）included　laying　the　foun－
dation　for　upgrading　the　industrial　structure．　Establishment　of　an
integrated　steel　mill　was　designated　as　a　priority　along　with　petro。
chemical　and　machinery　plants（Republic　of　Korea　l966）．　Foreign　capi－
tal　and　advanced　technology　were　indispensable　for　these　projects，　yet
these　were　not　available　domestically．　The　government　needed　to　ob－
tain　these　from　abroad．　Yet　again，　obtaining　these　from　abroad　was　not
easy，　either．　Almost　all　the　countries　and　institutions　Koreans　asked　for
cooperation　rejected　such　project　unilaterally　claiming　that　they　were
simply　not　feasible，　too　early　and　ambitious　for　Korea．
　　　When　Koreans　were　trying　hard　to　upgrade　their　industrial　struc－
ture　and　attain　these　new　targets　in　the　latter　half　of　the　1960s，　the
external　environment　started　to　deteriorate，　raising　uncertainties　and
concerns　for　them．　The　US．was　trapped　in　its　deepening　involvement
in　Indochina，　while　in　Korea，　infiltration　incidents　by　North　Korean
commandos　were　often　reported．　Allegedly，　the　Labor　Party　Confer－
ence　of　the　North　had　degided　tb　advance　a　policy　of　unification　by
force．　Park　and　his　government　started　to　feel　that　security　of　the
county　was　now　gravely　threat6ned．　They　had　been　totally　dependent
on　the　US　for　their　fragile　security　after　the　Korean　War．　However，　the
US　security　commitment　to　Korea　was　seemingly　becoming　dubious．
President　Nixon　releas¢d　the　Nixon　Doctrine　in　1969，　declaring　that　the
US　ground　forces　would　not　be　involved　anymore　in　any　regional　con・
flicts．　In　l971，　the　US　unilaterally　withdrew　one－third　of　its　troops　from
South　Korea，　and　Nixon　visited　Beijing　in　the　following　year　to　mark
the　beginning　of　the　US－China　normalization　talks．　The　sense　of　emer－
gency　was　paramount．　Establishing　self－defense　ernerged　as　an　urgent
priority　for　the　Koreans，　but　it　was　not　easy，　either．
　　　South　Korea　then　did　not　have　any　military　industry．　Even　a　single
rifle　could　not　be　produced　domestically．　Establishing　self－defense
absolutely　needed　a　military　industry，　which　in　turn　required　a　strong
heavy　industrial　base，　Accordingly，　heavy　and　chemical　industry　came
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to　be　necessary　not　only　for　realizing　more　sophisticated　industrial
structure，　or　even　merely　for　prestige，　but　for　the　very　vulnerable　na・
tional　security．　It　was　understood　to　be　the　issue　of　national　survival，
while　the　1970s　is　usually　regarded　as　the　era　of　d6tente　in　international
politics．
　　　Under　such　emergency　atmosphere，　the　political　regime　developed．
to　be　more　authoritarian　and　repressive　with　a　notorious　new　constitu－
tion　in　1972．　This　authoritarian　developmental　regime　strongly　pro－
pelled　heavy　and　chemical　industrialization　both　for　growth，　export，
and　security，　eventually　achieving　hyper　economic　growth　and　the
transfer　of　industria1／export　str1ユcture　to　the　one　based　upon　rather
sophisticated　heavy　and　chemical　industry　almost　only　in．one　decade．
For　this，　one　of　the　critical　factors　was　obtaining　capital　and　technology
from　abroad，　and　the　largest　source　for　both　was　Japan．
　　　After　the　assassination　of　Park　in　l979，　the　succeeding　regime　led
by　another　retired　general　Chun　Doo　Hwan　took　the　similar　way．
Under　the　renewed　Cold・War　tensions　in　the　1980s，　both　Japan　and　the
US　strongly　supported　this　regime，　and　thus　Chun　could　firmly　estab・
lish　the　basis　for　the　successor，　Roh　Tae　Woo，　also　a　retired　general，　to
make　the　nation　as　a　modern，　industrial　democracy．
THE　NEGOTIATIONS　FOR　FUNDING　AND　TECHNOLOGY
　　　Park　Chung　Hee　and　his　government　needed　to　manage　the　above－
explained　complex　environment　and　attain　their　goals　of　development
and　self－reliance　by　securing　foreign　funding　and　technology．　For　Kore－
ans，．like　for　others　in　the　developing　world，　however，　potential　donors
of　these　were　much　more　powerful　than　themselves　in　every　respect．
Negotiating　for　external　assistance　as　they　wish　was　n6t　easy　at　all，　and
yet　attracting　private　foreign　direct　investment　was　also　difficult　for　a
Cold－War　front　line　country18．
　　　Under　such　circumstances，　as　explained　above，　normalization　with
Japah　assured　the　availability　of　substantial　external　funding．　300
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million　dollars　in　grant　and　200　million　in　loan　in　addition　to　over　200
million　of　private　credit　were　agreed　to　be　provided　over　ten　years　in
yearly　installments　starting　from　the　end　of　1965．　In　order　to　implement
this　smoothly　based　upon　the　Japan－ROK　Economic　Cooperation　Agree－
ment　signed孟n　1965，　Korea　prepared　necessary　legislation　regarding　the
usage　and　management　of　the　fund．　The　basic　principle　was　that　the
grant　was　mainly　used　in　order　to　increase　rural　income，　while　the　loan
component　was　for　raising　the　nat三〇nal　standard　of　living　through
promoting　balanced　growth　of　industries（EPB　1982）．　Under　this　princi・
ple，　the　Korean　side　was　to　prepare　a　draft　annual　plan　of　the　usage　to
be　discussed　at　a　joint　committee　meeting　between　Japan　and　Korea，
which　would　finally　have　to　be　approved　by　the　respective　government
（MITI　1969）．
　　　In　addition　to　this　earmarked　money　for　ten　years，　additional　eco－
nomic　cooperation　was　sought　for　from　Japan　both　to　supplement　the
decreasing　US　aid19　and　to　further　propel　the　country’s　development
programs　and　projects　particularly　for　agricultural　and　industrial　de・
velopment　under　the　Five－Year　Economic　Development　Plans．　Negotia－
tions　for　these　economic　cooperation　matters　were　deployed　at　the
annual　ministerial　conference　instituted　by　the　agreement　between
Prime　Ministers　Sato　of　Japan　and　Cho　of　Korea　in　1967‘as　the　basis　for
Japan－Korea　cooperation’（Ko　1974）．　This　meeting，　made　up　of　minis－
ters－politicians－starting　in　August　1967，　played　an　important　role　in
deciding　the　overall　picture　of　cooperation　with　substantial　details．
Though　lengthy　detailed　negotiations　and　elaborate　technical　prepara－
tions　by　bureaucrats／technocrats　on　both　sides　preceded　this　annual
ministerial　meeting，　through　which　the　negotiations　actually　continued
almost　throughout　the　year，　final　decisions　were　made　by　the　ministers
at　the　conf6rence　of　a　few　days　a　year，　The　nature　of　sometimes　very
intensive　discussions　and　negotiations　were　indeed　very　political，　often
involving　various　other　issues　in　consideration　and　bargaining，
　　　Besides　this　official　conference，　there　were　also　significant　channels
of　mutual　understanding　and　cooperation　in　the　private　sector，　which　in
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fact　had　strong　ties　with　the　politico－bureaucratic　world．　The　Korea－
Japan　Private　Sector　Joint　Committee　was　established　in　1968　to　pro・
mote　joint　venture　business2°，　followed　by　the　creation　of　the　Korea－
Japan　Cooperation　Committee　in　the　next　year．　The　latter　had　sub－
committees　for　politics，　economy，　and　culture　respectively，　and　two
former　prime　ministers　assumed　the　positions　of　the　first　presidents　on
both　sides．　It　dealt　with　wide－ranging　issues　over　years，　and　worked　as
an　important　juncture　between　the　nations　by　connecting　public　and
private　elites　in　both　societies（Ko　1974；Lee　1985）．．　It　was　an　inter－
national　version　of　government－private　sector　cooperation　and　coordi－
nation，　which　is　usually　supposed　to　be　a　feature　of　the　East　Asian
developmental　state．
　　　Notwithstanding　these　deepening　ties　and　institutionalization　be－
tween　the　elites　since　the　late　1960s，　when　Korea　had　already　got　onto
the　track　of　its　high　economic　growth，　various　political　uncertainties
and　disturbances　emerged　one　after　another　so　that　the　bilateral　rela－
tions　did　not　develop　smoothly．　For　instance，　the　Okinawa　issue　raised
concerns　and　suspicion　among　Koreans　against　Japan，　while　d6ten彪for
Japan　was　understood　to　be　an　opportunity，　in　general，　to　pursue　its
independent　foreign　policy，　and　Japan　tried　to　balance　its　policy　toward
the　South　and　the　North．　Japan　also　approached　China　imnlediately
following　the　US，　completely　changing　the　power　configuration　in　the
region．　All　of　these　Japanese　behaviors　looked　hostile　to　South　Korea．
The　situation　was　further　aggravated　by　the　Korean　authoritarian
domestic　politics　and　the　South・North　problem：most　notably　the　Kiln
Dae　Jung　incident　in　19732監and　the　attempted　assassination　of　the　presi・
dent　in　197422．　The　bilateral　relationship　became　so　tense　to　the　extent
that　many　observers　anticipated　rupture　Of　diplomatic　relations　in　late
1974．The　above－mentioned　annual　ministerial　conference　was　delayed
in　1973，　and　even　cancelled　in　1974．　It　was　under　such　a　tightening
situation　that　Korea　embarked　on　its　heavy　and　chemical　industrializa・
tion　for　which　it　required　huge　amount　of　foreign　capital　and　technol－
ogy．　Even　with　the　sensitive　relations，　Japan　was　practically　the　largest
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possibility．　The　negotiations　for　finance　and　technology　had　to　be
pursued　to　the　swing　of　the　pendulum　between　cooperation　and　con－
frontation，
　　　　The　first　prime　example　reflecting　the　nature　of　such　negotiations
was　POSCO（Pohang　Iron　and　steel　Co．　Ltd．），　an　ihtegrated　steel　mill
project．　Establishing　an　integrated　steel　mill　was　designated　as　one　of
the　two　priorities　under　the　Second　Five－Year　Plan．　After　more　than
two　years　of　preparation　by　an　international　consortium　established　for
the　Korean　steel　mill，　however，　all　the　agencies　the　Korean　government
initially　contacted　for　assistance　rejected　the　request　in　19690n　the
ground　that　such　a　project　was　simply　too　ambitious　and　economically
not　feasible　in　Korea（Park　1988；Kim　1990）．　The　only　remaining　possi－
bility　was　with　Japan，　which　had　already　earmarked　huge　amount　of
economi6　cooperation　fund　for　Korea　under　the　Normalization　Treaty．
　　　　Apr61iminary　approach　to　Japan　for　cooperation　was　made　at　the
second　ministerial　conference　in　1968，　to　which　Japan’s　Minister　for
International　Trade　and　Industry　responded　negatively，　saying　that　the
proposed　project　was　irrational　since　such　a　small－scale　steel　mill　could
not　gain　competitiveness　in　the　world　market．　This　meant　that　in　order
to　persuade　Japan，　the　scale　problem　needed　to　be　cleared　so　that　the
proposed　plant　would　come　to　be　expected　to　attain　the　minimum　effi－
ciency　leve1．奄氏@scale．　The　Korean　side　responded　accordingly，　redesign－
ing　the　overall　plan　so　that　it　could　realize　scale　economy，　and
submitted　the　formal　request　for　cooperation　with　the　renewed　plan　to
Japan　two　weeks　before　the　third　ministerial　conference　in　1969．　In
addition　to　making　a　formal　request　to　the　MOFA，　the　Korean　side
offered　detailed　explanations　of　the　projects　at　the　working　level　of　the
relevant　ministries　in　Japan，　and　also　submitted　a　request　of　technical
．assistance　to　the　Japan　Iron　and　Steel　Federation．　The　President　of
POSCO　also　visited　Japan　and　made　a　request　for　cooperation　to　the
Cabinet　Vice－Minister．
　　　　It　was　only　one　month　after　Nixon　announced　his　Guam　Doctrine．
The　Japan－US　negotiations　for　the　return　of　Okinawa，　to　be　formally
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concluded　in　November　of　the　year　at　the　summit　meeting，　were　at　the
final　working　stage，　and　the　Korean　government　had　repeatedly　ex－
pressed　grave　concerns　and　requested　due　consideration　to　Japan　over
the　influence　of　the　matter　on　the　security　in　Asia，　particularly　in
Korea．　Therefore，　the　issue　at　stake　was　very　complex　for　Japan．　Eco－
nomic　and　technical　feasibility／rationality，　potential　future　competition
with　the　Japanese　industry，　security　in　Asia，　the　necessity　of　full　recov－
ery　of　sovereignty　over　Okinawa，　and　the　bilateral　relations　with　the
neighboring　country－all　of　these　had　to　be　taken　into　account．
　　　At　the　third　ministerial　conference，　the　Korean　side　requested　the
steel　mill　project　as　the　priority，　and　the　Japanese　side　basically　ac－
cepted　it，　agreeing　to　proceed　to　detailed　planning　and　implementation．
The　basic　cooperation　agreement　between　the　countries　was　signed　in
December　1969，　followed　by　the　private・sector　technical　consulting
contract　in　the　next　year．　Construction　started　in　October　1970，　and
completed　in　June　1973，　starting　operations　in　the　following　month．30．8
million　US　dollars　of　grant　and　46．43　million　dollars　in　loans　were　allo・
cated　from　the　semi－reparation　economic　cooperation　fund，　while　addi－
tiona152．50　million　dollars　of　Exim　Barlk　loans　and　38．33　million　of
commercial　loans　were　provided（MOFA　1975）．
　　　The　negotiations　as　well　as　the　final　decision　were　nothing　but
political．　As　reflected　in　the　previous　denial　of　other　donors，　project
feasibility　was　indeed　dubious　even　with　the　renewed　plan．　Most　of　the
bureaucrats’judgments　were　negative．　However，　it　was　generally　un－
derstood　in　Japan　that　the　government　agreed　to　the　economically
irrational　economic　cooperation　project　due　to　its　political　interests　of
realizing　the　return　of　Okinawa　on　the　favorable　conditions　to　Japan．
People　said‘the　government　sold　steel　and　bought　nawa（Okinawa）．’
ハfaωα　literally　means　rope．　The　Koreans　were　well　aware　of　such　condi－
tions．
　　　Another　obvious　manifestation　of　the　political　nature　and　Korea’s
skillfulness　in　the　negotiations　can　be　seen　with　the　case　of　other　Ko・
rean　priority　projects　at　the　next　year’s　ministerial　conference，　the
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heavy　industry　projects，　or　the　Four　Core　Projects．
　　　According　to　Kim　Chung－Yum（1990，1997），　Park’s　longest－serving
presidential　chief　secretary，　these　projects　（special　steel，　iron　casting，
heavy　machinery，　and　ship・building）were　originally　planned　as　the
basis　of　defense　industry．　With　the　increasing　uncertainties　and　threats
in　terms　of　security，　as　argued　above，　South　Korea　at　the　turn　of　the
decade　was　desperately　in　need　of　national　defense　industry，　for　which
they　needed　heavy　industrial　base．　The　Four　Core　Projects　were　sup。
posed　to　be　at　the．　core　of　it．　For　this，　however，　Korea　faced　the　problem
of　external　finance　and　technology　again，　and　the　government　decided
to　go　for　Japan　this　time　as　wel1．　Considering　the　military－phobia　of　the
pacifist　nation　in　general，　and　the　country’s　Three　Principles　of　Arms
Exports，　in　particular，　which　impoSe　an　embargo　on　the　sales　of　arms　to
the　countries　at，　or　potentially　at，　war，　the　projects　were　defined　as
heαvy　indust7　y　projects．　Further，　in　order　to　attract　more　attention　of
the　Japanese，　these　were　to　be　called　as　the　POSCO－related　heavy　indus・
try　projects．　Since　the　Japanese　side　was　skeptical　about　the　economic
feasibility　of　POSCO，　projects　that　would　generate　large　demands　for
POSCO　were　supposed　to　be　welcomed　by　Japan．
　　　The　external　environment　was　more．　and　more　tightening．　Just
several　days　before　the　Korean　government　submitted　their　formal
request　to　Japan　in　July　1970，　the　US　unilaterally　notified　Korea　that　it
would　withdraw　its　twenty　thousand　troops　from　the　peninsula　within
ayear．　There　was　no　time　to　waste．　Koreans　were　determined　to　realize
these　priority　projects　by　obtaining　Japanese　cooperation．　On　the　other
hand，　according　to　the　media　account，　the’tS　was　alleg dly　pressing
Japan　to　extend　economic　cooperation　to　Korea　to　supplement　US　mili－
tary　retreat．　The　public　opinion　in　Japan　was　concerned　about　the
potential　military　aid　to　Korea．
　　　The　Korean　side　tried　to　mitigate　the　concerns　and　obtain　funding，
claiming　that　they　had　no　intention　at　all　to　talk　with　the　Japanese
about　security　or　defense，　and　the　only　issues　were　on　agricultural　and
industrial　development　in　line　with　the　country’s　Five－Year　Develop・
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ment　Plan．　Japanese　response　to　this，　however，　was　very　cautious　and
just　diplomatic．　At　the　fourth　ministerial　conference　later　in　the　same
month，　the　Japanese　side　expressed　understanding，　while　Inaking　no
substantial　commitment　for　cooperation，　saying　they　were　prepared　to
conduct　relevant　preparatory　studies，　and　will　extend　finance　on　the
basis　of　those　studies　if　necessary，　After　the　conference，　the　Japanese
ministers　repeatedly　explained　to　their　own　nation　that　Japan　would
never　extend　military　assistance　to　the　country．
　　　Working・level　negotiations　followed，　and　a　Japanese　survey　mis－
sion　headed　by　a　director　general　of　MITI　was　dispatched　to　Korea　in
October，　reporting　various　difficulties　with　the　proposed　projects．
Then，　the　Korean　side　quickly　responded　to　this　and　adjusted　the　pro－
posals　so　that　they　could　satisfy　the　Japanese．　Thus　the　renewed　pro・
posals　were　again　to　be　submitted　onto　the　table　of　the　fifth　ministerial
conference　in　l971，　asking　for　commercial　loans　through　the　Exim　Bank
of　Japan．　Yet　again，　the　Japanese　side　did　not　make　any　definite　com・
mitment．　Negotiations　and　redesigning　continued　involving　private
compahies　on　both　sides，　yet　these　were　no　more　on　the　agenda　of　the
sixth　conference　in　l972．　A　few　years　later　in　the　mid－1970s，　under　the
totally　renewed　Heavy　and　Chemical　Industrialization　Program，　these
projects　were　finally　realized　one　by　one　as　private　joint　venture　pro－
jects　with　Japanese　firms．
　　　These　negotiations　for　the　Four　Core　Projects　were　not　as　success－
ful　as　those　for　POSCO，　In　retrospect，　however，　the　history　of　negotia－
tions　shows　an　amazing　degree　of　consistency，　determination　and
flexibility　on　the　Korean　side23，　which　finally　led　to　the　realization　of
each　project　over　years．　At　the　same　time，　while　having　failed　to　secure
cooperation　with　the　priority　projects　at　the　conference，　Koreans　won
some　minor　ones　as　they　wished．　For　instance，　at　the　fourth　conference，
agrant　aid　project　for　the　coming　three　years　was　agreed　upon　for
establishing　a　technical　high　school，　which　was　to　bear　an　important
role　in　the　coming　heavy　and　industrialization　program．　At　the　end　of
this　three・year　project，　the　seventh　mini．sterial　conference　agreed　on
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another　human　resource　project　of　the　Institute　of　Technology　at　Seoul
National　University　also　as　a　grant　aid　project（MITI　1975）．
　　　Just　before　the　opening　of　the　delayed　seventh　annual　ministerial
conference　in　December．1973，　Japan’s　Minister　for　International　Trade
and　Industry　Nakasone　announced　his　ministry’s　basic　attitude　to　eco－
nomic　cooperation　with　Korea　to　the　effect　that　the　annual　ministerial
conference　from　the　following　year　would　only　discuss　about　the　over・
all　economic　relations　and　detailed　cooperation　programs　and　projects
will　be　delegated　to　bureaucrats．　Following　this　new　policy，　which　was
approved　at　the　conference，　the　working－level　conference　was　instituted
ill　order　to　discuss　and　make　decisions・about　detailed　economic　coop－
eration　projects　and　programs，　and　the　first　meeting　was　held　in　April
1975in　Seoul．　It　was　a　major　revision　of　the　role　of　the　ministerial
conference　and　the　meaning　of　economic　cooperation　in　the　bilateral
relations：economic　cooperation　was　basically　depoliticized．　The　ten－
year　period　during　which　the　ear－marked　economic　cooperation　as　semi－
reparation　was　extended　was　also　ending．　At　the　same　time，　toward　the
mid－decade，　as　explained　above，　the　bilateral　relations　between　these
countries　were　deteriorating．
　　　Private　economic　ties　were　not　necessarily　directly　affected　by
these　fluctuations　in　inter・governmental　relations，　yet　ascending　China
and　its　antagonistic　stance　to　South　Korea24　substantially　affected　the
motivations　of　the　private　sector　to　opt　for　going　to　the　country　in　the
first　half　of　the　decade．
　　　However，　the　relationship　dramatically　improved　again　in　1975
after　the　fall　of　Saigon．　The　emergence　of　a　united　communist　Vietnam
revived　the　Cold　War　tensions　in　Asia　again，　leading　to　the　New　Cold
War　in　the　l980s　after　the　Soviet　aggression　against　Afghanistan．　The
eighth　Korea－Japan　ministerial　conference　in　l975　took　up　various　eco－
nomic　cooperation　projects　onto　the　agenda　and　agreed　on　them．　Under
the　new　strong　conservative　leadership　in　all　the　three　coUntries，　Ron－
ald　Reagan　in　the　US，　Nakasone　Yasuhiro　in　Japan　and　Chun　Doo　Hwan
in　South　Korea，　these　countries　renewed　their　alliance　in　the　1980s，　and
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another　large　batch　of．Japanese　loans25　was　provided　after　lengthy　ne。
gotiations　at　the　ministerial　level，　with　the　final　decision　made　by　the
Prime　Minister　Nakasone，　who　had　depoliticized　the　aid　process　in　l975．
　　　In　a　few　years　after　that，　South　Korea　was　democratized　in　l987，
and　successfully　sponsored　the　Olympic　Games　in　l988，　soon　becoming
one　of　the　free　advanced　industrial　democracies　needing　no　more　ODA．
CONCLUISIONS
　　　What　can　we　learn　froln　the　history　of　the　Republic　of　Korea　as　an
aid　recipient？The　environment　was　special　in　many　ways．　Most　im－
portantly，　it　was　a　divided　nation　under　the　international　Cold　War
system，　which　made　the　small　country　strategically　critical　for　the
United　States，　the　superpower，　and　to　a　lesser　degree　for　Japan，　its
neighbor　and　former　colonial　master．　Its　geopolitical　location　sur－
rounded　by　big　powers　of　both　of　the　blocs　further　tightened　the　situa－
tion，　and　thus　made　the　room　for　maneuvering　for　that　small　country
extremely　narrow　in　the　midst　of　big　power　politics．　Equally　important
is　that　the　country　is　known　to　be　the　most　typical　example　of　the　East
Asian　developmental　state，　which　realized　miracuious　economic　growth
under　successive　authoritarian　regimes　committed　to　growth　and　devel－
opment．　Moreover，　because　of　the　situation　explained　above，　the　coun－
try　was　almost　entitled　to　substantial　amount　of　foreign　assistance，　yet
the　sources　of　the　assistance　and　cooperation　both　in　terms　of　finance
and　technology　were　extremely　limited：only　to　the　United　States　and
Japan，　and　West　Germany　with　much　less　leverage．　Of　these　two　do－
nors，　the　US　was　retreating　in　the　late　1960s　onwards，　demanding　more
burden　sharing　and　responsibilities　to　rising　Japan．　As　a　result，　South
Korean　industrialization　and　development　at　its　crucial　stage　had　to
depend　on　Japan’s　cooperation　to　a　significant　degree．　This　made
Korea’s　bilateral　relations　with　Japan　of　critical　importance，　while　its
dependence　on　the　US　for　security　continued，　In　this　regard，　Korea　was
exceptionally　lucky　because　it　had　the　relatively　large　amount　of
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earmarked　fund　assured　for　years　from　the　mid・1960s　as　semi－
reparation．　Without　this，　funding　for　POSCO，　for　instance，　might　not
have　become　available．　In　order　for　Korea　to　get　funding　as　they
wished，　they　needed　to　win　the　tough　negotiations　with　Japan　over　the
usage，　but　not　necessarily　for　finance　itself．　This　might　make　a　large
difference．　Yet　again，　there　were　ample　reasons　for　Japan　to　decline　the
Korean　proposals，　Potential　future　competitions　with　its　own　industry
were　one　of　its　concerns，　while　cooperation　for　defense　industry　was
almost　taboo　in　the　Japanese　national　feeling．　Accordingly，　this　study
tried　to　explore　how　Koreans　could　manage　these　sensitive　but　ex－
tremely　important　relations　to　achieve　their　goal　of　economic　develop－
ment．
　　　Although　the　paper　did　not　elaborate　much　into　details，　the　follow・
ing　could　be　pointed　out　as　important　that　made　Korea　more　effective
in　negotiating　necessary　assistance　than　otherwise　possible．
　　　First，　the　process　was　indeed　political．　Decisions　of　economic　coop－
eration　between　Korea　and　Japan　quite　often　were　made　on　the　basis　of
politics　rather　than　economic　rationality，　which　international　financial
institutions　such　as　the　World　Bank　always　insisted　upon　in　assessing
the　feasibility　of　the　proposed　project，　Since　the　final　negotiations　and
decision－making　were　in　the　hands　of　ministers，　it　took　various　factors
and　influence　into　consideration　which　were　sometimes　rather　irrele－
vant　to　the　proposed　project　itself．　In　other　words，　politics　could　some・
times　make　economically　irrational　project　acceptable　and　feasible．　The
Koreans　knew　this．　Japan’s　cooperation　to　POSCO　was　a　case　in　point，
which，　however，　in　the　end　turned　to　be　a　huge　economic　success．
　　　Then，　second，　the　above－mentioned　feature　gave　Koreans　substan－
tial　room　for　maneuvering　if　they　were　well－prepared，　thoughtful　and
skilful　enough．　By　connecting　some　issues　of　concerns　for　the　counter－
part，　Japan，　tQ　those　important　for　themselves，　Koreans　tried　to　mitigate
the　problem　and　draw　compromise．　Being　a　recipient　requesting　eco－
nomic　and　technical　cooperation，　Korea　was　not　in　a　strong　position．
Nevertheless，　the　policy－makers　and　negotiators　were　very　pragmatic，
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and　thus　flexible　and　always　rational　in　trying　to　turn　the　negotiations
in　favor　of　themselves　so　that　they　could　finally　approach　what　they
wanted．　They　could　sometimes　use　the　pressures　from　the　third　coun－
try，　the　US，　effectively　on　their　behalf．
　　　In　other　words，　it　could　be　rephrased　that　the　Koreans　had　very
strong　ownership26　over　the　economic　cooperation　programs　even　in　the
asymmetric　power　relations　between　the　donor　and　the　recipient．
Strong　ownership　was　there　because　they　already　had　the　firmly－
committed　national　objectives　of　development，　which　were　represented
as　the　Five－Year　Economic　Development　Plans　and　other　specific　plans
and　projects　Ileeding　external　finance　and　technology．　Under　the
highly　developmental　and　goa1－oriented　regime　in　the　country，　actual
implementation　status　of　these　plans　was　always　closely　monitored，
annually　assessed　and　adjusted　accordingly．　The　targets　and　priority
projects　of　the　plans　needed　to　be　achieved　by　all　means，　and　the　neces－
sary　external　resources　were　sought　for，　in　many　cases，　from　Japan．
These　plans　were　those　of　the　conventional　mid－term　planning　of　the
time　as　elsewhere，　yet　over　which　the　Koreans　had　exceptionally　strong
ownership　and　commitment．　They　were　not　just　waiting　for　donors　to
come　to　finance　the　plans，　but　tried　extremely　hard　to　realize　them　by
obtaining　finance　and　cooperation　even　by　making　the　donors’priority
change．
　　　In　sum，　the　small　developmental　regime　in　East　Asia　successfully
managed　the　complex　and　acrimonious　international　environment　of
big　power　politics　by　the　strong　ownership，　commitment　and　pragma・
tism，　which　were　the　basic　attributes　of　the　developmentαl　state．　And
once　the　external　cooperation　is　secured，　as　the　conventional　wisdom
tells　us，　the　same　set　of　these　attributes　assured　the　successful　imple－
mentation　and　sustainability．
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Notes
l　This　work　has　been　supported　by　the　Grant－in・Aid　for　Scientific　Research
　　Program　by　the　Ministry　of　Education，　Culture，　Sports，　Science　and
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　　　Technology（MEXT），　Japan，　and　an　earlier　version　of　this　paper　was　pre－
　　　sented　at　the　International　Conference　on　Social　Sciences　Sri　Lanka，16－18
　　　July　2008，　Kelaniya　University，　Sri　Lanka．　The　author　is　grateful　for　the
　　　financial　support　from　the　Japanese　government　and　for　the　constructive
　　　comments　from　the　participants　at　the　conference．
2　Heavy　industrialization　in　the　1970s　constituted　an　important　phase　in
　　　Korea’s　miracle，　though　this　program　was　very　controversial　domestically
　　　as　well　as　internationally　since　it　also　created　huge　costs　to　the　people　and
　　　the　economy．
3　For　example，　the　Three　Non－Nuclear　Principles　of　Japan　will　not　allow　any
　　　party　to　bring　nuclear　weapons　into　its　territories．
4　Many　observers　argue　that　the　fundamental　tenet　of　Japan’s　foreign　policy
　　　has　not　changed　much　since．then，　at　least　until　quite　recently（Green．2003）．
5　The　Colombo　Plan　for　Cooperative　Economic　and　Social　Development　in
　　　Asia　and　the　Pacific　is　a　regional　inter－governmental　organization　estab－
　　　lished　in　1951　to　enhance　economic　and　social　development　of　the　countries
　　　of　the　region（http：／／www．colombo・plan．org／）．
6With　the　increasing　Cold　War　tensions　in　East　Asia　since　the　latter　half　of
　　　the　1940s，　the　US　had　to　revise　its　policy　toward　Japan　so　that　Japan　would
　　　become　resilient　again　to　block　the　communist　expansion．　Too　heavy
　　　paying　burdens　were　thought　to　threaten　this．　All　the　Allied　Powers　were
　　　persuaded　to　agree，　while　the　former　occupied　territories　in　the　developing
　　　world　did　not　accept　it（Yoshida　1957）．
7　See　Yoshida（1957：157）．　Yoshida，　an　ex－diplomat，　served　as　prime　minister
　　　from　1946　to　1947，　and　again　from　l948　to　l954．　Later　Premier　Kishi（1957－
　　　1960）also　expressed　a　similar　view　on　his　return　from　Southeast　Asian
　　　countries　in　1957（MOFA　1957）．
8　Formal　postwar　reparation　was　paid　only　to　four　countries，　Burma，　the
　　　Philippines，　Indonesia　and　South　Vietnam，　while　the　other　eight　received
　　　the　de　facto　compensation　under　economic　cooperation　agreements．　South
　　　Korea　was　included　in　the　latter　group．
9　Japan－Korea　Economic　Association　was　established　in　l960，　five　years
　　　before　the　normalization　of　diplomatic　relations　between　the　countries，　in
　　　order　to　promote　economic　relations　in　the　private　sector．（http：／／www．
　　　jke．or．jp／jkegaiyo．html）
10　This　association　is　usually　regarded　as　the　quasi　agent　of　Pyongyang
　　　government　in∫apan　mobilizing　fund　and　organizing　anti－South　political
　　　activities　there．
ll　The　most　notable　example　is　Kim　Dae・Jung．　KCIA，　the　South　Korean　state
　　　intelligence　agency　tried　to　counter　him　by　abducting　him　in　Japan　to　be
　　　taken　home，　which　raised　a　serious　diplomatic　problem　between　the　two
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countries　in　1973．
Under　the　l955・system，　where　the　LDP　always　kept　single　majority，　discus－
sions　in　the　Diet　did　not　usually　change　the　result，　In　the　televised　sessions
of　questions　to　the　government　and　discussions，　MPs　were　more　conscious
about　the　local　reactions　in　their　constituencies．
Such　a　situation　gradually　changed　in　the　1980s　when　the　budget　con－
straints　became　more　serious　on　one　hand，　and　the　already　hugely　ex・
panded　Japanese　ODA　started　to　draw　attentions　of　critiques．　The　fall　of
the　Marcos　regime　in　the　Philippines　in　1986　shed　light　on　the　issue　of　ODA
and　corruption　in　recipient　countries，　and　many　Diet　members　tried　to
inVeStigate　it．
Although　this　regime　ended　in　l979，　the　basic　framework　of　the　country’s
political　economy　remained　intact　in　the　following　two　decades　until　the
extensive　overhaul　after　the　Asian　Financial　Crisis　of　1997．
Armistice　was　agreed　in　1953　among　the　US，　China，　and　North　Korea，　while
South　Korea　disagreed．
The　Japanese　strongly　resisted　calling　this　compensation　or　reparation，
while　the　Korean　side　claimed　that　they　were　entitled　to　claim　substantial
money　for　the　damages　they　received　during　colonisation．
For　instance，　the　targeted　average　growth　rate　was　7．1　per　cent　per　year，
yet　it　actually　recorded　8．5　per　cent　during　the　period，　while　the　population
growth　was　sustained　at　2．73　per　cent　as　opposed　to　the　prolected　2．81　per
cent（EPB　1982）．　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　，
In　fact，　South　Korea　those　days　much　preferred　loans　to　foreign　direct
investment，　which　could　not　easily　fall　under　its　own　control．　Due　to　its
colonial　history，　probably　amplified　by　the　influence　of　the　dependency
theory　in　the　l960s　and　the　1970s，　Korean　leaders　were　very　cautious　about
foreign　domination．
In　March　l969，　the　USAID，　the　US　aid　agency，　announced　that　it　would
terminate　its　grant　aid　program　to　Korea　in　l971（Asia∠Almanac　1970）．
Faced　with　a　heavy　debt　burden，　Korea　changed　its　policy　in　l968　to　we1－
come　foreign　direct　investment，　Further，　in　order　to　promote　some　priority
industries　under　the　heavy　and　chemical　industrialization　program，　a　new
foreign　investment　act　was　enacted　and　joint　ventures　were　strongly　en－
couraged　in　the　l970s（MITI　l975）．
See　footnote　l　l　above．
ASouth　Korean　national　with　the　Japanese　permanent　residence　at－
tempted　to　assassinate　President　Park　in　August　1974．　Later　investigation
allegedly　found　the　involvement　of　the　General　Association　of　Korean
Residents　in　Japan，　the　pro－North　de　facto　political　organization．　The
South　Korean　government　demanded　apology　and　stricter　control　of　the
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organization　by　the　Japanese　authorities，　which　Japan　declined．
See　Horikane（2005）for　more　details　of　these　projects．
Chinese　Premier　Zhou　Enlai　declared　in　1970　that　China　would　not　go　into
business　with　companies　that　were　assisting　South　Korean　Park’s　aggres－
sion　against　the　North．
Four　billion　US　dollars　in　seven　years，　of　which　1．85　billion　was　given　as
ODA（yen　loans）．
The　concept　of（country）ownership　became　popular　in　the　discussion　of
the　effectiveness　of　aid　in　the　international　aid　community　in　the　1990s．　It
refers　to　the　awareness　on　the　side　of　recipient　countries　that　the　aid　pro－
jects／programs　were　of　their　own　so　that　they　should　be　responsible　for
them．　Lack　of　country　ownership　was　considered　one　of　the　prime　reasons
whey　aid　had　not　worked　effectively　in　the　past．
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